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The anterior portion of the inferior parietal cortex possesses comprehensive representations of actions
embedded in behavioural contexts. Mirror neurons, which respond to both self-executed and observed
actions, exist in this brain region in addition to those originally found in the premotor cortex. We found
that parietal mirror neurons responded differentially to identical actions embedded in different contexts.
Another type of parietal mirror neuron represents an inverse and complementary property of responding
equally to dissimilar actions made by itself and others for an identical purpose. Here, we propose a
hypothesis that these sets of inferior parietal neurons constitute a neural basis for encoding the semantic
equivalence of various actions across different agents and contexts. The neurons have mirror neuron
properties, and they encoded generalization of agents, differentiation of outcomes, and categorization of
actions that led to common functions. By integrating the activities of these mirror neurons with various
codings, we further suggest that in the ancestral primates’ brains, these various representations of
meaningful action led to the gradual establishment of equivalence relations among the different types of
actions, by sharing common action semantics. Such differential codings of the components of actions
might represent precursors to the parts of protolanguage, such as gestural communication, which are
shared among various members of a society. Finally, we suggest that the inferior parietal cortex serves as
# 2009 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business
Correspondence should be addressed to: Atsushi Iriki, Laboratory for Symbolic Cognitive Development, RIKEN Brain Science
Institute, 2-1 Hirosawa, Wako-shi, Saitama 351-0198, Japan. E-mail: iriki@brain.riken.jp
We thank Professor Leonardo Fogassi for valuable comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. This study was supported
by JSPS and MEXT Japan.
*The first and the second authors contributed equally.
SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE, 2010, 5 (1), 105 117
www.psypress.com/socialneuroscience DOI:10.1080/17470910802625306an interface between this action semantics system and other higher semantic systems, through common
structures of action representation that mimic language syntax.
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INTRODUCTION
In human society, knowledge is usually expanded
and shared through linguistic communications
among society members, and mutual observation
of various acts also contributes to such knowledge
distribution. Non-human animals, without linguis-
tic faculty, understand the goal-directed actions,
to share common understandings among conspe-
cifics about the situations that the actions evoked.
The mirror neuron system has been thought to
subserve this faculty (Iacoboni, 2005; Iacoboni
et al., 2005; Oztop, Kawato, & Arbib, 2006;
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Mirror neurons
are neural substrates found originally in the
monkey premotor cortex (Rizzolatti & Craighero,
2004) and later in the intraparietal lobule (IPL)
(Fogassi et al., 2005; Tanaka, Yokochi, & Iriki,
2004), which activated equally during executing
and observing corresponding goal-directed ac-
tions. Thus, monkeys could sense the actions of
others, at least at the cellular level.
Understanding of other’s action through mere
observation would be quite beneficial for animals
in terms of learning novel but effective behavior
emitted by that individual. However, non-human
animals in wild habitats rarely imitate the actions
of others (Tomasello & Call, 1997), although they
may notice that they are being imitated (Paukner,
Anderson, Borelli, Visalberghi, & Ferrari, 2005).
Although many reports have claimed imitation in
non-human animals, many of the observations
could be interpreted as ‘‘local enhancement’’,
‘‘stimulus enhancement’’, or some other mechan-
ism (Zentall, 2006). That is, there is an obvious
discrepancy in behaviour: The animals can recog-
nize similarity of actions performed by them-
selves and others, both behaviorally and neurally,
but they do not copy the actions of others with
their own body.
This discrepancy may be partly understood by
assuming that their actions are embedded, as a
whole, into the environment that is strongly
connected to biologically-important events such
as food and conspecific animals. Indeed, through
the mirror neuron activities, the goal of action
(e.g., food) that is directly linked to its cause
(view of that food) in the environment could be
inferred regardless of the agents that execute the
action, but precise structures and the form of the
action per se are not able to be extracted through
neuronal discharge patterns. This lack of analysis
would prevent them from analysing actions into
elements, and from further structuralizing the
components into a series of actions leading to a
goal. Lack of precise structure in the mirrored
representation of actions in monkeys would
prevent them from imitation (Iriki, 2006). As we
will discuss, most of the mirror neuron activity
found in monkey F5 were strongly connected to
the goal of action.
In contrast, human linguistic expressions of
actions possess explicit components of actions*
namely, agent, form, and consequence of actions,
which in turn are represented as parts of a
sentence, such as subject (S), verb (V), and object
(O), integrated by syntactical structures. Thanks
to these structures, the listener or observer can
understand the actions and their embedded con-
text without actually participating in the situation
where the actions occurred. Because the imitation
requires not only attendance to the goal of the
target action (i.e., stimulus enhancement) but also
reproduction of the behavioral sequences leading
to that goal, it is likely that humans are excep-
tional in analysing action streams into smaller
components and flexibly manipulating them
through a specific rule.
In this article, we propose a possible frame-
work for investigating multiple levels of symbolic
representation to produce a human-specific ac-
tion semantic system based on two types of
evidence: one coming from the literature on
mirror neurons, and the other based on observa-
tions performed by the authors that, although
quite anecdotal in nature, are nonetheless inter-
esting for speculating about semantic equiva-
lence. By showing fragments of evidence found
in mirror-neuron activities in the parietal area of
Japanese monkeys interacting with an experimen-
ter, we hypothesized a possible developmental
course of abstract representation through actions,
underlining an aspect of linguistic communica-
tion. Actually, the observed neuronal data were
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unique characteristics of activities in the recorded
area and our experimental condition, which was
intended not to firmly tune up the monkeys for a
specific task, but to abstract ‘‘natural’’ neural
activities of untrained, communicative behavior.
Still, we try to find signs of abstract action
analysis from the monkey data, rather than
abandon them as unreliable, to bridge between
direct and symbolic encoding of actions by
observation.
BRAIN AREAS FOR INTEGRATING
MEANINGFUL ACTIONS
Recognition and integration of
meaningful actions by inferior parietal
cortex
The coordination of higher-order motor
functions*including the sequencing and orches-
tration of elementary motions and the use of
objects or tools to achieve an intended purpose*
relies on internally represented plans for, and
predictions about, meaningful actions as well as
sensorimotor integration for guiding those ac-
tions. When we plan an action*say, to pick up a
glass of water and take a drink*we usually only
hold the general goal or desired outcome in mind;
the detailed forms, fine motion and postural
adjustments, kinematics, degrees of force, and
sequential structures of the intended action are
selected automatically, outside of awareness, as
the action unfolds. Monkey experiments (Gra-
ziano & Gross, 1998; Rizzolatti, Luppino, &
Matelli, 1998), brain imaging studies (Blakemore,
Wolpert, & Firth, 2002), and clinical evidence
(Buxbaum, 2001; Leiguarda & Marsden, 2000)
suggest that planning actions and guiding body
movements are closely integrated in both the
parietal and frontal lobes working in parallel.
Thus, an action’s intention and ultimate goal
should be represented in one brain area indepen-
dently of its kinematic or structural details but
must nonetheless be functionally linked to an-
other circuit that is responsible for orchestrating
those details. This independence would predict
two kinds of related neural responses to physically
observed or performed actions. There must be (1)
neurons that respond differentially to identical
acts when they are components of larger action
sequences performed to achieve different pur-
poses (e.g., sticking out a finger to push a button
versus using the finger to point to a distant object),
and (2) other neurons that respond equally to
differently structured actions when they are made
to fulfil an identical goal (e.g., picking up a mug by
either its handle or its sides in order to take a
drink). Also, in the same cortical areas in which
such information processing is performed, there
should exist neurons with transitional properties
between the two cognitive components described
above, reflecting their integration.
Wherein the cerebral cortex should we look for
these neural characteristics? The most likely
candidate is the inferior parietal cortex, where
both multisensory and sensorimotor integration
are known to take place (Mountcastle, Lynch,
Georgopoulos, Sakata, & Acuna, 1975). For a long
time, the inferior parietal cortex has been re-
garded as a sensory associative area that inte-
grates somatosensory and visual information. In
classical single-cell recording experiments in mon-
keys, the inferior parietal cortex also appears to
subserve higher-level cognitive functions related
to action (Blakemore et al., 2002; Buxbaum, 2001;
Graziano & Gross, 1998; Leinonen & Nyman,
1979; Leinonen, Hyva ¨rinen, Nyman, & Lirman-
koski, 1979; Rizzolatti et al., 1998). In addition,
this area is known as a site for controlling the
neural responses of various top-down mental
processes such as attention, motivation, and con-
text-dependent behavior (Hyva ¨rinen, 1981, 1982;
Mountcastle et al., 1975; Robinson & Burton,
1980; Rolls et al., 1979). In monkeys, its anterior
portion (area 7b) is known to be interconnected
with area F5 of the premotor cortex (Matelli,
Camarda, Glickstein, & Rizzolatti, 1986; Rozzi
et al., 2006), where neurons with similar properties
have been detected (Rizzolatti et al., 1988).
Action understanding in premotor and
parietal neurons
In animal communities, including human socie-
ties, actions exhibited by community members
tend to share common semantic and kinematic
characteristics by dint of shared anatomies, bodily
dynamics, and cognitive abilities. These common-
alities should provide grounding for perceptual
generalizations and categorizations about move-
ments and, by extension, about the motivations or
goals behind those movements. Neural response
properties that fulfil these assumptions do indeed
exist in the cerebral cortex. Mirror neurons,
originally reported in the premotor cortex (e.g.,
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later in IPL (Fogassi et al., 2005; Tanaka et al.,
2004), respond equally well during observation of
others executing goal-directed actions as they do
during execution of the same actions by the
subjects themselves.
This unique property could derive from gen-
eralization of actions’ appearances across differ-
ent agents. In Figure 1, we categorize the response
properties of mirror neurons from the observed
data, with different levels of abstraction in a
behavioral context involving agents (subjects, S),
action forms (verb, V), goals (objects, O), and
other variables (others, Ot), together with gener-
alized expressions with symbol (‘‘Coding’’ col-
umn) and its cognitive function (‘‘Neuro-cognitive
processes’’ column). The first rows of the figure
show the ‘‘Classical mirror neuron’’ response
property exhibited by F5 (Rizzolatti et al., 1996)
and 7b neurons, where equivalent action forms
(V) and goals (O) by different subjects (X, Y) are
coded equally. This response property can be
expressed as ‘‘*   (V O)’’, where * denotes
compatibility of the subjects (i.e., indifferent of
specific agent), and the parentheses indicate the
specificity (i.e., uniqueness) of the element. For
these premotor mirror neurons to encode actions
as being equivalent among different agents based
on similar action kinetics, actions executed by
either hand or tool (Ferrari, Rozzi, & Fogassi,
2005) should be firmly connected to some biolo-
gically relevant stimuli or events.
Establishment of semantic equivalence
through the parietal mirror neuron
system
However, as the relationship between behavior
and object increases, involvement of the parietal
lobebecomescritical.Indeed,Buccinoetal.(2001)
reported that, in human subjects, besides activa-
tions found in premotor cortex, the parietal lobe
was involved more when an observed action
involved a specific object goal than when it did
not involve it, as in mimicking the action. Thus,the
parietal lobe is responsible for ‘‘pragmatic’’ de-
scription of object-related actions, in contrast to
‘‘semantic’’ object description by the infero-tem-
poral lobe (Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sa-
kata, 1995). This interpretation is consistent with
activations of mirror neurons found in the IPL by
Fogassi et al. (2005). Two different types of action
were executed, by both subject monkeys and a
human experimenter: reaching for a food pellet
and putting it in a container, and reaching for a
Figure 1. Summary of observed and predicted properties of mirror neurons in premotor (F5, from Rizzolatti et al., 1996 and Figure
2) and inferior parietal cortex (7b, from Fogassi et al., 2005, Figure 3, and Figure 4). Each action sequence can be analysed and
described by agents (X, Y, general form in ‘‘S’’, like subject), action forms (A, B, general form in ‘‘V’’, like verb), goal of action
(objects, general form in ‘‘O’’), and other variables (others, general form in ‘‘Ot’’). These elements are expressed in symbols as
shown in the ‘‘Coding’’ column. In this column, ‘‘*’’denotes compatibility with any substitutes. Elements in parentheses indicate that
these must be speciﬁc, not compatible with any substitutes. Possible ‘‘Neuro-cognitive processes’’ are proposed in the rightmost
column. The bottom row depicts our predictions based on these results, suggesting that when mirror neurons with ﬁve different
properties are integrated into a system, the ‘‘Equivalence relations’’ will emerge in the brain to produce a human-like ﬂexible
linguistic system.
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dency’’ as shown in Figure 1). Some neurons
encoded identical actions (V) differently, because
in each case,the action was being performed in the
service of a different final goal (Ot). Additionally,
the neurons showed the same selective firing
pattern during the observation of each action
performed by the experimenter (S). Thus, these
parietal mirror neurons conceptually extend their
responses on the basis of context, intention, and
purpose behind an action, regardless of its kine-
matic similarities of actions and temporal proxi-
mity between action and intended goal (*   V 
O (Ot)). Hence it is likely that these neurons are
crucial for the higher-order conceptual under-
standing of events. This faculty should be particu-
larly beneficial in social contexts, where exchanges
of information about external and internal events
are critically important.
EXPERIMENTAL OBSERVATION
OF MIRROR-NEURON ACTIVITY IN
AREA 7B
Available lines of evidence suggest that a neural
system that crucially includes multiple types of
mirror neuron exists and serves as an interface
between physical action sequences and action
semantics. However, one key piece of evidence
still lacking is the second class of neuron de-
scribed above (2)*that is, neurons that respond
equally to different and dissimilar actions (V) that
have common or identical behavioral meanings
(O) in a given context (*   *   (O)).
We have found that such neurons do in fact
exist in the monkey inferior parietal cortex. We
recorded activities of such neurons from area 7bof
four hemispheres of three Japanese monkeys
(Macaca fuscata) using a single unit recording
method.
1 The details of the methods for prepara-
tion of animals for electrophysiological experi-
ment, and histological identification of the brain
areas were identical to those described in previous
publications (e.g., Iwamura, Tanaka, Sakamoto, &
Hikosaka, 1993; Yokochi, Tanaka, Kumashiro, &
Iriki, 2003). Most of the time during the experi-
ments, no particular training was required for the
monkeys, and they were interacting with the
experimenter using various kinds of food rewards,
instruments, and container.
2
The neurons in parietal area 7b discharge when
the monkey observes actions related to objects
performed by the experimenter, such as placing,
grasping, and reaching, and there are some neu-
rons having somatosensory receptive fields, which
tended to be distributed around the face or neck
region and often extended from the hand to the
upper arm. Among these neurons, we observed
neuronal activities exhibiting mirror neuron prop-
erties: responding both when the monkey itself
executed an action and when it watched the
experimenter executing a similar or related action.
Neural response with mirror neuron
properties
The recording sites of the neurons with mirror-
like properties are shown in Figure 2 through 4,
together with the precise locations of the re-
corded neurons. No particular pattern of localiza-
tion was observed with respect to these neurons’
functional properties, nor was any laminar bias in
their distribution detected by the histological
examination. Figure 2A shows the typical re-
sponse pattern of 80 neurons, which was similar
to those of premotor mirror neurons, discharging
both while executing a particular goal-directed
action and while observing another performing
the same action. These neurons exhibited an
inhibitory form of mirror neuron-like response
(Figure 2B), with sustained, spontaneous dis-
charges punctuated by selective periods of inhibi-
tion while the monkey or the experimenter
performed the same action, such as picking up a
piece of food with a precision grip.
Activity modulated by reward value
Some of the neurons having mirror neuron
properties responded differentially to picking up
1 The experiments were approved by the Animal
Experiment Committee of the RIKEN Brain Science
Institute and the Animal Care and Use Committee of the
Tokyo Medical and Dental University. All husbandry and
experimental procedures were in accordance with the Guide
for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals of the National
Research Council (1996) and the Guidelines for Animal
Experimentation of the RIKEN Brain Science Institute and
the Tokyo Medical and Dental University.
2 The experimenter always sat at the same table position to
the right of the monkey and gave him food rewards*sweet
potatoes, peanuts, raisins, or cookies cut into 1 cm cubes. Brief
descriptions of the experimental conditions can be found in
the captions of Figures 2 4.
ACTION SEMANTICS IN MONKEY PARIETAL NEURONS 109different types of food, even though the forms of
the grip or the actions’ kinematics were nearly
identical. Figure 3A represents a typical example
of such neurons. The neuronal activity was
recorded as the experimenter picked up the
food with forceps, brought it to the monkey, and
let the monkey pinch the food away and eat it.
The neurons fired differentially when the final
reward was peanut, cookies, or raisins. The
strength of the activity was dependent on the
monkey’s preference: activity was the strongest
with the favourite food (i.e., cookies).
Figure 2. Generalization process of action understandings. A: A representative example of inferior parietal neurons whose
response patterns resemble those of classical mirror neurons in the F5 premotor cortex. Neural discharge in raster plots (top of the
graph) and histograms showing numbers of spikes occurring per 100 ms bin (ordinate) are shown along the time axis (abscissa).
Behavioural events were examined frame by frame (30 frames per second). This format is identical for all neural activity graphs in
Figures 2 4. In this condition, the experimenter reached into the container, which sat in front of the monkey on the table, picked up
the reward with his or her ﬁngers and handed it to the monkey, which then grabbed the food, brought it to its mouth and ate it. This
neuron discharged both when the monkey observed the experimenter picking up a piece of food with a precision grip (red bars under
the abscissa, and red circle in the inset) and when the monkey picked up food in the same manner (blue underline and circle). B:
Neural recording sites. Data from four hemispheres of three monkeys are projected onto the right parietal area (area shown by the
square in the inset) of one monkey, normalized in relation to species-general conﬁgurations of intraparietal sulcus. cs, central sulcus;
ips, intraparietal sulcus; ls, lateral sulcus. The red dot indicates the electrode tract from which the neurons depicted in A were
recorded.
Figure 3. Early processes for establishment of functional equivalence of action semantics. A: A representative example of neurons
that exhibited activity similar to mirror neurons, ﬁring equally during grip actions performed by the experimenter (using forceps,
indicated by red bars under the abscissa) and by the monkeys themselves (using thumb and index ﬁnger, indicated by blue bars).
They differed from classical mirror neuron properties in that they ﬁred differently depending on the monkeys’ preference of objects
to grip (indicated in the graph). In this example, from the left, the experimenter used forceps to pick up and hand over the rewards to
the monkey, and then he picked up three different rewards, cookies, peanuts, and raisins, one by one. This sequence was repeated
twice to see replicability of the differential activities. Insets illustrate actions by the experimenter (red circle) or the monkey (blue
circle). B: Neural recording sites. The red dot indicates the electrode tract from which the neurons depicted in A were recorded.
110 YAMAZAKI ET AL.Activity representing categorization of
different actions by context
If the neurons in the inferior parietal cortex
generalize their responses to actions regardless
of agent and operand, including external objects
(i.e., tools) as well as original body parts (see
Figures 2 and 3), it is possible that they code the
meanings or semantics per se of actions. Figure 4
depicts two instances in which the monkey was
handed a lidded container with food sealed inside.
In Figure 4A, the recoded neuron discharged (1)
when the experimenter opened the container, (2)
when the experimenter closed the container, and
(3) when the monkey opened the container. It is
noteworthy that the neuron discharged equally on
either opening or closing the container, because
the kinematics of these two actions is completely
opposite. The response property of such neurons
was not a generalization of agents and action
kinematics as found in ordinary mirror neurons
but more an arbitrary categorization of actions
based on the context in which the actions were
embedded. Fogassi et el. (2005) found the con-
text-dependent activity by area 7b neurons, which
would be in contrast to that shown in Figure 4A:
differential responses depending on the contexts
in the former, and categorized responses depend-
ing on a common context in the latter.
Activity representing categorization of
different actions by shared function
Different types of categorization were also found
in area 7b neurons. Figure 4B depicts an activity
Figure 4. Late functional equivalence process or preliminary process for establishment of stimulus equivalence among action
semantics. A: A representative example of inferior parietal neurons that discharged equally to different actions embedded in the
same behavioural context. In this condition, the container was sealed with a lid after the experimenter put a piece of food in it, and
then handed to the monkey, which then removed the lid, grabbed the reward from inside, brought it to its mouth and ate it. This
neuron discharged when the monkey observed the experimenter either opening (red bars under the abscissa, and red circle in the
inset) or closing (red dashed bars under the abscissa, and red dashed circle in the inset) the container and also when the monkey
opened the container (blue underline and circle). B: In this condition, the container could be opened using either of two distinct
actions*by pushing a button at its base or by pulling up the lid. To teach the monkeys to push the button, the experimenter guided
the monkeys’ hand to push the button for several times. Then they gradually learned to push the button to get food items inside
within a day. A representative example of neurons in which spontaneous discharges were inhibited equally when the monkey
observed the experimenter opening the container by lifting its lid (red bars under the abscissa, and red circle in the inset) and also
when the monkey pushed the lid-opening button on the device on which the container was placed (blue underline and circle). C:
Neural recording sites. The red dots indicate the electrode tracts from which the neurons depicted in A and B, respectively, were
recorded.
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spontaneous firing that was suppressed during
two different epochs: when the experimenter
opened the lid of the container by pulling it up
with her fingers, and when the monkey pushed
the button on the device to open the lid mechani-
cally. Thus this neuron responded when either the
experimenter or the monkey performed an action
that resulted in the lid opening*even though the
actions were completely different in form.
INTEGRATION OF ACTIVITIES TO
ESTABLISH HUMAN-ACTION
SEMANTICS
Neural response with classical mirror
neuron properties in area 7b
In area 7b of Japanese monkeys, we found
neurons with response properties similar to those
of the ‘‘classical’’ mirror neurons that were
originally found in the F5 premotor cortex (e.g.,
Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Figure 1). In addition, we
found other mirror-like neurons whose response
patterns differed notably in two ways.
The first class closely resembles classical pre-
motor mirror neurons (Figure 2). These cells
generalize the kinematics or appearances of
actions, together with their immediate goals,
across agents. This allows concrete phenomenal
components to be shared among community
members and may resemble the phonetic struc-
tures of language contingent on specific behavior.
Indeed, these classical mirror neurons are most
frequently observed in the premotor cortex or
area F5 in monkeys (Rizzolatti et al., 1996), which
are proposed to be homologous with Broca’s area
in humans, where phonetic motor linguistic func-
tions are encoded (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998).
Activity with reward dependency
In the second class of neuron (Figure 3), activity
corresponding to a given action element is sig-
nificantly modulated by goal and context*by the
overarching action structure in which the element
is embedded (Fogassi et al., 2005) and by the
action’s intent or purpose. Thus, these neurons
encode at least a preliminary form of action
semantics. In daily life, no action (except perhaps
pantomime) stands alone; all elementary actions
are embedded in meaningful, goal-directed
sequences ofaction. Based onanideomotivational
state to achieve an intended goal, the agent
estimates the consequences of its movements
while making continuous fine adjustments as its
behavior unfolds. Through this process, fragments
of movement are combined into meaningful ac-
tions whose components are closely related se-
mantically, through a common goal.
Activity representing different actions
with common functions
The third class of neuron encodes the semantics
of actions without respect to their kinematics or
appearances. These neurons fire equally to differ-
ent actions executed by different agents if the
meanings of their actions are nonetheless the
same. That is, pinching using forceps by the
experimenter or using a precision grip by either
monkeys or the experimenter were coded as
equivalent (Figure 3). These neurons generalize
the meaning of action further than those that
respond to the use of tools but less than those that
respond to the use of hands, as reported earlier
for neurons in the premotor cortex (Ferrari et al.,
2005; Umilta ` et al., 2008). When the actions with
different kinematics appear in a common context,
they are categorized into the same class of
behavior, which induces the same neural activa-
tion pattern (Figure 4A). The meaning was
further abstracted by the neurons that responded
to completely different actions for opening a lid:
by pulling it up or by pushing a button (Figure
4B). Thus, the abstract semantic equivalence of
actions, either self-executed or observed, is estab-
lished regardless of their concrete appearances.
These neural properties are the exact inverse of
the other known class of parietal mirror neuron
mentioned earlier (Fogassi et al., 2005), which
responds differentially to identical kinematics
when they are embedded in different contexts
and thus have distinct meanings. That is, this class
of neuron nicely forms reciprocal and comple-
mentary combinations with the former class to
comprise a parity of elemental equality and
inequality involved in the forms and semantics
of actions. Response properties from both of
these classes of neurons could be derived from
those of the first class, which perform a top-down
process of generalization that interacts with the
bottom-up additive integration processes. Thus, in
concert, these inferior parietal mirror neurons,
perhaps in cooperation with premotor neurons,
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lence among actions.
As seen in the ‘‘Coding’’ column in Figure 1,
the properties of the inferior parietal neurons that
show mirror-neuron-like activity can be described
as combinations of three categories of elements:
agents (S), action forms (V), and their goals (O).
Some of these elements have compatibility with
any alternative, denoted as ‘‘*’’, whereas those in
parentheses indicate that the elements are spe-
cific. In the case of the ‘‘Classical mirror neurons’’
shown in Figure 2, the neurons are indifferent to
the individual agency (X, Y) but do respect
combinations of action forms and goals (*  
(V O)). The neurons with ‘‘Reward depen-
dency’’ (Figure 3), in contrast, respond selectively
to an action’s ultimate or intended goals, although
agents (S) and action forms (V) are treated as
equivalent (* V  (O)). This property is con-
sistent with the study reporting area 7b neurons
influenced by motivational and behavioral vari-
ables (Hyva ¨rinen, 1981, 1982). In this respect,
they are akin to premotor neurons (Kohler et al.,
2002) that are known to have reciprocal projec-
tions with area 7b (Matelli et al., 1986). The
neurons shown in Figure 4 deal only with the
objects of the action (O), not with agents or
action (*   *   (O)). Note that when these
neurons work together, parietal mirror neurons
can encode both each behavioral segment and
groups of segments. With these properties, it
seems likely that they contribute to higher-order
action recognition such as serial integration and
segmentation of actions (as opposed to lower-
order functions such as coding individual action
elements or sequences).
In humans, fMRI studies of normal subjects
show right inferior parietal activation during
action observation (Buccino et al., 2001) and
while viewing actions in context (Iacoboni et al.,
2005). In Buccino et al. (2001), activity of inferior
parietal region was modulated whether the per-
formed actions had goals (e.g., grasping apple)
or just mimicking. In the case of Iacoboni et al.
(2005), different activity in this region was
observed depending on whether same action
(grasping a cup) was embedded in the different
contexts (drinking from it, cleaning it up). Thus,
the neurons in this region have not only the
classical mirror-neuron property but also the
property of coding ‘‘functionally related to the
observed act’’. This highly abstract mirror neuron
system is then free from physical similarity, not
only between the agents, but also the action
kinematics: It can classify highly dissimilar action
sequences from multiple modalities as being
equivalent just by dint of their having the same
final goal. This system could be a very important
contributor to several higher cognitive functions,
such as categorization and concept formation in
one direction, and imitation of another’s action in
the other direction.
The human supramarginal area*which corre-
sponds to the monkey brain area that we studied
(Passingham, 1998)*is regarded as the centre of
symbolic function, representing the meanings of
abstract forms (Farah, 1989; Goldenberg & Hag-
mann, 1997), and as one of the most greatly
expanded areas along the course of hominine
evolution (cf. Holloway, 1996). On these bases, we
propose that the monkey inferior parietal area
possesses a mechanism for integrating and ab-
stracting the semantics of actions having common
purposes, which are shared by community mem-
bers and which in turn may have served as a
precursor to the human linguistic faculty to
support the semantic aspects of the coding.
Linguistic faculty viewed beyond
equivalence of action semantics
The advanced mirror properties demonstrated in
our experiment seem to comprise a correlate of
the behavioral phenomenon called ‘‘functional
equivalence’’*an equivalent classification
formed by dint of sharing the same consequence
(Schusterman & Kastak, 1998; Vaughan, 1988).
That is, if the responses to stimuli A, B, C, and D
all lead to the same behavioral consequence (e.g.,
reward) whereas E, F, G, and H lead to another
(e.g., no reward), then animals classify the former
four stimuli and the latter four stimuli into two
separate classes. The stimuli within each class are
equivalent in terms of their functions. With this
ability, animals are able to form concepts of
objects which do not necessarily share physical
similarities. Semantics thus represented, and
shared among society members, could conceiva-
bly serve as fundamental components of a com-
munication system.
Multiple coding and activities of
parietal mirror neurons
Assuming that functional equivalence is built
upon the neural properties depicted in Figures 2
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would be related to a primitive symbolic system
that has later developed into the abstract linguis-
tic system in humans. In this system, multiple
elements often code for a single event or action
using stimuli from multiple modalities such as
auditory, visual, and motor stimuli. Such duplicate
coding is superior to single coding because it
remains useful if any of the modalities are not
available. That is, a multiple-coding system makes
communication stable across diverse situations
and between individuals belonging to the same
community. As multiple codes signify a common
event, this coding system should be directly
dependent on the faculty for functional equiva-
lence. The parietal region is the most plausible
candidate for a multiple-coding site based on
multimodal integration, which would be compar-
able to the evidence of multimodal integration in
premotor cortex (Kohler et al., 2002).
From functional equivalence to
stimulus equivalence
Evidence of establishment of functional equiva-
lence alone, however, would not be a sufficient
condition for stimuli to be equivalent. In other
words, even if some nonhuman animal were
shown to have acquired multiple coding, presum-
ably supported by inferior parietal activity, it is
doubtful whether they could manipulate these
codings as substitutable (or exchangeable) for
each other beyond spatiotemporal constraints, as
humans often do.
In order to establish a human-level linguistic
faculty, representations of action equivalence and
semantics would need to be associated with an
arbitrary code shared among society members. At
this stage, the mirror neurons in the monkey 7b
area with generalizing functions (Figure 4B)
would afford such shared coding. This code could
become a set of general signs for conveying a set
of meanings among members, thus becoming a
form of language. This phenomenon could come
about through the establishment of a kind of
inference called ‘‘stimulus equivalence’’ (e.g.,
Sidman, 1994). Stimulus equivalence refers to
establishment of emergent exchangeable rela-
tions among arbitrary, sometimes multimodal,
stimuli through a minimum matching-to-sample
training set. Because this type of relational
learning seems to be particularly beneficial in
vocabulary learning in human children, and is
exhibited almost exclusively by humans (see
Yamazaki, 2004 for a review), it surely plays a
vital role in the evolution of language and other
uniquely human kinds or degrees of cognition,
and could have only evolved after the group size
of the human ancestors became large enough for
communication among members outside immedi-
ate relatives to become demanding. This faculty
might be extrapolated from the semantic action-
equivalence properties of the inferior parietal
neurons described in the following analysis.
The establishment of equivalence relations is
best understood by assuming acquisition of the
meanings of words. When we learn that object A
is called ‘‘A’’, then, without further instructions,
we can naturally recognize that the name ‘‘A’’
stands for object A, not object B. Such bidirec-
tional (but not necessarily logically correct)
association between object and name must
greatly facilitate the acquisition of language in
younger children. The bidirectional association
can be expanded to more complex relationships*
that is, when taught ‘‘if A, then B’’ (A0B) and
B0C, both children and adults readily draw not
only the bidirectional inference (B0A, C0B,
‘‘symmetry’’) but also the transitive inference
(A0C, ‘‘transitivity’’) and its bidirectional infer-
ence (C0A, ‘‘equivalence’’) (Sidman, 1994).
How, then, could the elementary components of
such equivalence inferences be represented in the
monkey inferior parietal cortex, and how could
evolution have adapted these mirror-like func-
tions to use stimulus equivalence as a language
precursor?
To fill in the missing links in the chain leading
from functional equivalence to equivalence rela-
tions, we offer some predictions about the possi-
ble integrated neural properties derived from the
interaction of the three types of neuronal activity
shown in Figures 2 4 and obtained from Fogassi
et al. (2005). In this type of coding, subject,
action, and goal are grouped into one unit, and
this unit is exchangeable for other units composed
of different subject, action, and object (*   *  
*). In this cording, not only physical but also
functional similarities become irrelevant to the
meaning of a set of action. Whether or not one
can recognize the meaning of that set depends on
rules of a community or a group to which
individuals belong. That is, the meaning of a
given set of subject, action, and object is deter-
mined arbitrarily by community, so it requires
highly developed cognitive ability for abstraction.
Because of this abstraction of any types of
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activities by the inferior parietal lobule for
supporting functional equivalence should play a
critical role in development of this type of coding,
in concert with premotor mirror neurons which
would support abstraction of actions.
The above type of coding is presumably found
only in humans, exemplified in gestural language
systems, symbolic ritual customs, and various
types of arts, such as painting, dancing, and
drama. However, the most effective media to
recognize highly abstract sets of action would be
words, with which humans could convey the
arbitrary meanings of them independent of spa-
tiotemporal factors. If these units are substituted
by specific words, then the words can be even
translated into other languages, contributing to
broaden linguistic systems of action semantics.
For these relations to be established, neural and
behavioral faculties of equivalence relations
should be prepared in the agents.
The expansion of human social interaction, not
only within but also between communities, would
have been a critical factor contributing to the
changes in our coding system that established
uniquely human activities. Several cognitive pro-
cesses would be operative during such translation,
such as multisensory integration and visuomotor
coordination*both of which have strong ties to
the activities of the inferior parietal region. Thus
we expect that this part of the brain should
contain a still-undiscovered group of neurons
that show similar responses to each other and to
different combinations of the elements (again the
elements are from three categories: subjects,
actions, and goals) once one of them is condi-
tioned to be related to another element from
another combination (lower part of Figure 1). For
example, in the case of Figure 4B, when [experi-
menter-pulling up-food from the container] (call
set A, for example) shares functional equivalence
with another set having the different subject and
action, but same goal [monkey-push button-food
from the container] (set B), sets A and B would
become functionally equivalent sets, supported by
neural activities. If, then, there is another set,
having different subject, action, and goal, but the
goal shares a context [experimenter-close the
container-food in the container] (set C), then
sets A, B, and C may become equivalent via a
mechanism supported by neural activities found
in Figure 4A. At this point, the elements eliciting
similar activity become equivalent and inter-
changeable through different levels of coding
mechanism. Various multimodal stimuli related
to actions and their consequences are equivalent
to each other, regardless of physical similarity or
spatial or temporal proximity. By developing this
type of coding, humans would have acquired
flexible communication, initially using actions
and contingent stimuli, and then gradually estab-
lishing equivalence between the stimuli or events.
CONCLUSIONS
The neural representations used by members of a
primate society for drawing common semantic
inferences from actions embedded in shared
situations may comprise the foundational neural
mechanisms of language. In this paper, we have
described three classes of neuron (Figures 2 4) in
the monkey inferior parietal cortex with mirror-
like or mirror-related properties that encode
semantic equivalence between the actions of self
and others despite their imperfect equality and
sometimes completely different appearance. We
propose that these three neural populations
interact to produce a flexible, powerful semantic
system, called equivalence relations, which has
become uniquely superdeveloped in humans
(Figure 1). We argue that this line of neural
properties should bring about a semantic-equiva-
lence system in which any element may become
connected to any other semantic unit within the
system.
The preliminary stage in the development of
our semantic-equivalence system is represented
by neurons with classical F5 premotor mirror
properties (Figure 2), in which the kinematics or
appearances of actions together with their im-
mediate goals are coded without regard to which
agent (whether self or other) performs them. As
such, representations of concrete phenomenal
components could be shared as discrete elements
among community members, perhaps prefiguring
the phonetic aspects of language.
In the next set of neurons, the representations
of the above elements are modified depending on
the context in which they are embedded. Activity
corresponding to kinematically identical actions
differs if the actions have different purposes or
goals (Figure 3) (Fogassi et al., 2005). Thus, these
neurons are more deeply attuned to the semantics
of actions, rather than to their immediate appear-
ances.
The third set of neurons identified by the
present study encodes an even deeper level of
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equally to different actions performed by differ-
ent agents regardless of kinematic appearance so
long as the actions share the same purpose in the
global scheme of the whole act*thus establishing
the semantic equivalence of the actions, either
from executed (intrinsic somato-sensorimotor) or
observed (extrinsic visual) information.
We assume that the instability of the neuronal
activity in area 7b would be a key characteristic in
representing abstract aspects of the action events.
We also assume that there is not much difference
in area 7b activity between monkeys and humans.
Rather, there may be differences in connection in
which the action representations are categorized
into independent components and further en-
coded as linguistic faculties. By being supported
by this encoding system, the representation of the
actions in humans could become much more
abstract and flexibly interconnected with the
other action representations.
Based on these several mirror-like neural
response properties observed in the inferior par-
ietal cortex, we expect additional sets of neurons
that encode a yet further abstract level of semantic
equivalence could be established in advanced
primates (lower part of Figure 1). We surmise
that, using these various representations of mean-
ingful actions, together with contingent stimuli
from several modalities, common understandings
of semantic contents emerged in the human brain
through the gradual establishment of equivalence
relations. The inferior parietal cortex is suggested
to interface the action semantics system with a
language system that results in far more flexible
and reliable communication among community
members. This function would represent the pre-
cursor to uniquely human cognitive functions that
allow us to regard disparate phenomena as
equivalent. The establishment of such equivalence
relations is thought to be one of the critical factors
leading to the human linguistic faculty.
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